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We employ the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives.
The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a signiﬁcant role in our development, since among other
of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms
motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions
for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use.
A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable
construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical
foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system
that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed
through characterization of so-called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a
central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks
supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate
associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the
supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a
theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated
sets in question.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
“Mathematics as an expression of the human mind reﬂects the active will, the contemplative reason, and the desire for aesthetic
perfection. Its basic elements are logic and intuition, analysis and construction, generality and individuality. Though different tra-
ditions may emphasize different aspects, it is only the interplay of these antithetic forces and the struggle for their synthesis that
constitute the life, usefulness, and supreme value of mathematical science.” [8]
“One expects that logic, as a branch of applied mathematics, will not only use existing tools from mathematics, but also that it will
lead to the creation of newmathematical tools, tools that arise out of the need to model some real world phenomena not adequately
modeled by previously known mathematical structures.” [4]
1. Introduction
Analytic writing on mind and consciousness dates to Aristotle’s De Anima [3]. Yet to this day the phenomena of con-
sciousness continue to elude illuminating scientiﬁc characterization. We should not be surprised at this since,
“A physical scientist does not introduce awareness (sensation or perception) into his theories, and having thus removed the mind
from nature, he cannot expect to ﬁnd it there.” [26]
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frameworks have heretofore been constructed. However more contemporary mathematical development has begun to deal
with features of self-reference. We shall address Schrödinger’s critique by assembling and extending such development
thereby putting self-reference as a form of awareness into theory. In this way we shall frame mathematical foundations for
a theory of consciousness. Then as an application to a neural network model of brain circuitry, we shall exhibit a theory of
consciousness using these foundations.
1.1. Mathematical thought and its limits
Platonism, that is, the interplay of ideal1 and physical worlds, characterizes a central feature of mathematical thought.
The briefest summary of the evolution of this Platonic dualism in mathematical thought and modeling might be made by
citing the contributions of Euclid (the axiomatic method), Aristotle (the law of the excluded middle), Cantor [7], [16], [18]
(set theory), Russell [25] (his well-known paradox in set theory), Zermelo [30], Fränkel [12] and Von Neumann [28] (the ax-
ioms of set theory that serve to accommodate Russell’s paradox) and Gödel (incompleteness, a self-referential development).
We shall extend this line and employ the axiomatic theory of sets to further characterize self-referential features.
The work of Zermelo–Fränkel and others transformed sets from so-called naïve objects into mathematical primitives (i.e.,
ideal Platonic objects). The Russell paradox and its accommodation demonstrate limitations on mathematical thought (about
sets and related constructs). Today we are not surprised by such a limitation, since we have the well-known example of
Heisenberg. The Platonic character of the latter is characterized by the Heisenberg inequality, its ideal form [11], and its real
world character by the limitation on the accuracies with which certain concurrent measurements can be made. The quality
of self-reference (set self-membership) underlying the Russell paradox informs development of the ideal Platonic structures
(i.e., of placing awareness into theory) required for constructing the mathematical foundations we seek.
1.2. Consciousness and its limits
As with the self-referential potentiality of naïve set theory, the self-referential character of consciousness appears para-
doxical. It seems to be an illusion. The incompleteness of mathematical thought demonstrated by Gödel, suggests that all
thought, and so consciousness in particular, is not explainable via a conventional approach such as by a Turing machine
computation [23]. Incompleteness, while precluding establishment of certain knowledge within a system, allows for its establishment
by looking onto the system from the outside. This knowledge from the outside (a kind of observing) is reminiscent of consciousness
that provides as it does a viewing or experiencing of what’s going on in thought processing. Note the correspondence of these
observations to Freud’s meta-psychology where he recognizes a disconnect between mental and physical states,
“. . .mental and physical states represent two different aspects of reality, each irreducible to the other.” [27]
However we may say that Freud’s psychoanalytic method is a tool devised for penetrating the mental from the outside
via the physical. Compare Freud’s dual aspects of reality with the Platonic pairing of Descartes [10], namely the res cogitans
(ideal) and the res extensa (physical).
To frame a set theoretic correspondent to these features note that in axiomatic theory, a set has an inside (its elements)
and an outside (the latter is not a set, as we shall see), and this allows a set to be studied from the outside. We liken this
to interplay between the ideal (Platonic) and physical (computable) worlds, the latter characterizing a model for study from
the outside of the former. So we expect consciousness to be accessible to study through extensions of the self-reference
quality characterized by axiomatic set theory, in particular, by a special capacity to study a set from the outside. We do not
claim that this gives a complete characterization of consciousness, although it might very well do so in the end. Rather this
approach is an effectual way to introduce awareness into a theory (accommodating thereby Schrödinger’s critique) and so
to penetrate this elusive phenomenon.
1.3. Summary
Section 2 begins with a description of the crises in mathematical thought precipitated by Cantor’s set theory and char-
acterized by the Russell paradox. We describe how Gödel’s discoveries inform the crises and furnish motivation for our
development. We introduce a mathematical framework that includes sets, graphs, decorations, and the notion of non-well-
founded sets and which enables annunciation of the Anti-foundation Axiom of set theory. This axiom allows replacement of
the Russell paradox by a logically coherent dichotomy and is key to framing our approach characterized by observation of
sets from the outside.
In Section 3 we introduce the Russell operator R, a distinguisher between so-called normal and abnormal sets. A number
of properties of R is collected, these to play a central role in the foundations to be developed. Then we introduce a
1 An ideal object or concept in the Platonic sense will sometimes be referred to as a Platonic object or concept or for emphasis as an ideal Platonic
object.
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operator syntactic framework is followed by a semantic development in which experience and consciousness are introduced
as primitives. A Semantic Thesis for consciousness is then proposed, and a list of axioms for associated operators along
with a descriptive semantics for each axiom is given (compare [2]). The axioms along with their semantics are used for
characterizing both the primitives and consciousness. R is shown to satisfy the axioms, giving it thereby the role of a
so-called consciousness operator. This existence of a consciousness operator establishes consistency of the new axioms.
Examples both of sets and operators illustrating the syntax and semantics are given.
In Section 4 we give a description of tools for building a theory of consciousness upon the foundations developed. This
begins with a formal process for labeling and then decorating a graph. The process establishes a way to induce the existence
of a virtual set associated intrinsically with a graph (a two-level or self-referential feature). We then introduce a mapping
construct called a histogram, a tool for applying this set with graph association process to a special class of graphs arising
in brain circuitry. The M-Z equation is then developed, this equation characterizing a method for specifying the intrinsic set
in question, including those that arise in brain circuitry. Finally the theory of consciousness is formulated as an application
in which we employ neural network theory (Hebb’s rule for synaptic weight change and the McCulloch–Pitts equation
for neuronal input–output dynamics (see [15])) to specify the special class of labeled graphs in question. This two-level
procedure is interpreted as a Platonic process (that is, the association of a virtual set with a graph) by means of what we
call a Neural Network Semantic Thesis. An example of a neural state that instantiates the concept of a particular natural
number is given. To complete the description of information processing from sensory perception through to consciousness,
a third, purely physical, so-called Neuro-physiological Thesis is introduced. Section 4 concludes with a critical description
both of these three theses and the analytic formalisms developed earlier. This critique serves to illuminate the mathematical
foundations of consciousness developed.
In Section 5 we ascribe syntactic and semantic nomenclature to a collection of basic operators, also offering interpreta-
tions of the role each plays in our theory. The ﬂow of information from sensory input to conscious experience is described.
Speculation is offered on the role of the sets we have constructed in this information ﬂow. Finally a class of operators that
characterize qualia is described.
In Section 6 directions of future work are laid out. These include (i) examples and applications of the M-Z equation
developed in Section 4, including the development of associated dynamics induced by the consciousness operators, (ii) the
study of the diagonalization of KA , a special consciousness operator that informs the study of qualia and their neural
correlates, (iii) connection of our mathematical foundations with processes of evolution, (iv) study of bi-simulation of graphs
that characterizes the case that two memes share a thema, (v) model theoretic foundations of Aczel theory dealing with
the consistency of the Z-F Axioms with anti-foundation replacing foundation, (vi) study of the algebra of the fundamental
operators appearing in Table 3.1, and (vii) classiﬁcation of the consciousness operators and the connection of doing this to
Gödelian incompleteness.
The axioms of set theory that we employ explicitly are given in Appendix A. This is followed by a glossary.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we describe the crises in mathematical thought engendered by the notions developed by Cantor, Russell
and others. Then we describe the evolution of the crises according to the development of Zermelo–Fränkel, Gödel and
others. We continue with the introduction of terminology and properties that provide the setting for our work.
2.1. Crises in mathematical thought
We begin with Cantor’s deﬁnition of a set, often regarded as the naïve notion of set.
“A set is a collection into a whole of deﬁnite, distinct objects of our intuition or thought.”
When speciﬁcity is required, we shall hereafter use the term collection for a set in the sense of Cantor’s deﬁnition.
Cantor’s use of the word “thought” shows that set theory is entwined with consciousness from the start. In fact, Cantor’s
deﬁnition is circular, replacing one mystery by another. It replaces the unanswered questions: what is a deﬁnite object?
what is thought? by others, namely: who does the collecting? the thinking? The latter have a correspondence to the ques-
tions often raised in consciousness studies, “Who is doing the looking? the experiencing?” Suppose the words “intuition or
thought” in Cantor’s deﬁnition are replaced by the word “consciousness”. This would make it an exception to Schrödinger’s
critique, relating it to what is perhaps the only other known exception, namely to Von Neumann’s (mysterious) appeal to
the observer’s consciousness of the outcome of a measurement to specify the moment of collapse of the wave function
during a quantum mechanical measuring process.
Cantor’s deﬁnition of a set supports a logical inconsistency, resulting in several paradoxes. The most accessible of these
is the Russell paradox that goes to the essence of that inconsistency. This paradox is expressed in terms of the Russell naïve
set N , which is the collection of all sets x such that x is not a member of x. The logical inconsistency of N is revealed by
the following observations:
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2. If N ∈ N, then N /∈ N. If N /∈ N, then N ∈ N. (2.1)
The annunciation of this paradox by Russell (Zermelo and even Cantor is thought to have known earlier of the paradox)
precipitated a major crisis in mathematical and philosophical thought. In 1902, Frege [13] had just completed development
of an axiomatic treatment of sets when a letter to him from Russell informing him of the paradox overturned his central
thesis. Various mathematicians (Bernays [5], Gödel [14], Hilbert [16], Russell [25], Von Neumann [28], Whitehead [29], . . .)
attempted to rework the foundations of mathematics so as to resolve the(se) paradox(es). It is the axiomatic approach to
set theory that provides for us the most fruitful resolution, motivating our own development. (See Appendix A for these
axioms.) The key feature of the axiomatic approach is to regard the concept “set” as a primitive (an undeﬁned notion), and
the concept “is an element of” as a primitive relation. The axioms are chosen to ensure that there does not exist a set y
such that x ∈ y if and only if x /∈ x; in other words, within axiomatic set theory, there is no Russell set. Even so, this axiomatic
approach allows for a coherent elaboration of the quality of self-reference in set theory, and so, it supports the connection
of the study of sets to the development of the mathematical foundations we are after.
We use Z-F, the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms of set theory, however replacing FA, the Foundation Axiom (a latter day addition
by Von Neumann [28] to the original Z-F list) by AFA, the Anti-foundation Axiom [1]. To distinguish a set in the sense of
these axioms from a collection of Cantor, we shall use the terminology, bona ﬁde set for the former.
Although successfully accommodating the paradox, the axiomatic development of set theory brought with it a deeper
problem: is the axiomatic system itself consistent? That is, can we derive a logical inconsistency from the axioms? Gödel
produced a two level approach to this issue. At a mathematical level is a set theoretic formula, and at a meta-mathematical
level is the proposition asserting the consistency of set theory. We interpret this as an instance of self-reference, a viewing of
a mathematical object meta-mathematically, that is from the outside. Gödel showed that if axiomatic set theory is consistent
then it is incomplete. This incompleteness is widely celebrated (see Gödel–Escher–Bach of Hofstadter [17], Emperor’s New
Mind of Penrose [23], Scientiﬁc American 1968).
One might say that Gödel replaced one crisis in mathematical thought by another. Subsequently, mathematicians [1] did
show that if Z-F with FA deleted is consistent, then Z-F with AFA replacing FA is also consistent. These results of Gödel and
his successors provide for us the framework to develop our self-referential two level approach that consists, in particular, of
a syntactic level and a semantic level.
2.2. Sets, graphs, decorations, the axiom of anti-foundation
The special nature of set theory can be traced in part to the use of two different notions of belonging associated with
sets. One is denoted by ∈ (the primitive concept ‘is an element of ’) and the other by ⊂ (for the concept ‘is a subset of ’).
For clarity we adopt the following notational conventions.
(a) Sets will be denoted by Latin characters, a, A,b, . . . .
Braces will also denote a set, the contents of which and/or conditions specifying the set placed within the braces:
{list of set elements and/or conditions for being a set element}.
(b) Mappings between sets will be denoted by lower case Greek characters, α, β , . . . .
(c) Relations and operators as well as certain special objects to be introduced called classes will be denoted with upper
case script Latin letters, A,B, . . . ,R, . . .. A generic operator will be denoted by an upper case script O .
(d) The empty set {x | x = x} will, as usual, be denoted by ∅. The existence of ∅ follows from the Z-F Axioms of Existence
and Comprehension (see Appendix A).
We shall restrict our attention to pure sets speciﬁed as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A set is a pure set if its elements are sets, the elements of its elements are sets, etc.
Note that any ﬁnite collection (naïve set) of objects that are not themselves bona ﬁde sets furnishes an example of a not
pure set. Our presentation involves both normal and abnormal sets, these set types speciﬁed as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A set x is normal if x /∈ x. It is abnormal if x ∈ x.
The Quine atom speciﬁed in the following deﬁnition supplies an example of an abnormal set.
Deﬁnition 2.3. The Quine atom Ω is the set deﬁned by the condition Ω = {Ω}.
We shall make use of a collection of notions speciﬁed in the following paragraph. (See [1], Ch. 1.)
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A graph2 will consist of a collection N of nodes and a collection E of edges, each edge being an ordered pair (n,n′) of
nodes. No knowledge of the nature of the elements of N is required. If (n,n′) is an edge, we shall write n → n′ and say that
n′ is a child of the node n, the latter called a parent of the node n′ . A path is a sequence (ﬁnite or inﬁnite)
n0 → n1 → n2 → ·· ·
of nodes n0,n1,n2, . . . linked by edges (n0,n1), (n1,n2), . . . . A pointed graph is a graph together with a distinguished node
called its point. A pointed graph is accessible, i.e., is an accessible pointed graph (apg), if for every node n there is a path
n0 → n1 → ·· · → n from the point n0 to the node n. If this path is always unique then the pointed graph is a tree, and
the point is the root of the tree. A decoration of a graph is an assignment of a set to each node of the graph so that the
elements of the set assigned to a node are the sets assigned to the children of that node. Alternatively a decoration is a set
valued function d on N such that
∀a ∈ N, da = {db | a → b}. (2.2)
A picture of a set is an accessible pointed graph that has a decoration in which the set is assigned to the point. A given set
may have many pictures. Being well-founded, a key property of graphs and sets is speciﬁed in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.4. A graph is well-founded if it has no inﬁnite path. It is non-well-founded otherwise.
With this terminology, we collect the known results stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5.
(i) Every well-founded graph has a unique decoration.
(ii) Every well-founded apg is a picture of a unique set.
(iii) Every set has a picture.
Continuing, we deﬁne well-foundedness for sets.
Deﬁnition 2.6. A set is well-founded if its picture is well-founded. It is non-well-founded otherwise.
An alternate name for a non-well-founded set is a hyper-set, but we prefer never to use the latter term.
We now state the Anti-foundation Axiom that is central to the development. Note it is stated for general graphs that are
neither necessarily pointed nor necessarily accessible.
AFA (Aczel). Every graph has a unique decoration.
Some consequences of this axiom are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.7.
1. Every pointed graph is the picture of a unique set.
2. Non-well-founded sets exist.
3. A non-well-founded graph will picture a non-well-founded set.
4. Every set is the decoration of at least one apg.
Proof. See [1]. 
The relationship between these concepts is summarized in terms of two mappings, the tree mapping τ and the decora-
tion of the point P mapping δ is shown in Fig. 2.1.
2 What we call a graph is in fact a directed graph. For convenience we drop the descriptor directed throughout.
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There are many graphs Γi , the decoration of whose point is a given set A. That is, for the map δ, we have
δΓ1 = δΓ2 = · · · = A. (2.3)
However there is a unique pointed graph, Γ∗ = Γ∗(A) called the canonical tree of A, such that δΓ∗ = A and
τ A = Γ∗(A). (2.4)
The canonical tree of a set is speciﬁed in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.8. A ﬁnite collection x, x1, . . . , xn of sets forms a chain beginning at x if xn ∈ xn−1 ∈ · · · ∈ x1 ∈ x. The tree τ x of
x is the graph whose nodes are chains beginning at x and whose edges are given by (xn ∈ xn−1 ∈ · · · ∈ x1 ∈ (x, xn+1) ∈ xn ∈
· · · ∈ x1 ∈ x).
δ(Γ, p) will denote the set associated with the node p of the graph Γ in the decoration of the latter. So δΓ = δ(Γ, P )
is the set in the decoration of the pointed graph Γ that corresponds to the point P of Γ . Then a suﬃcient condition for
normality of a set is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.9. If for every child c of P , δ(Γ, c) = δ(Γ, P ), then δ(Γ, P ) is normal.3
2.3. Classes and mappings
Classes are primitives introduced by Gödel. A collection of sets with a common property is called a class. A set is also a
class; a class that is not a set is called a proper class. The elements of a class are sets, the sets being the primitives deﬁned
by the Z-F Axioms with the AFA replacing the FA. Conversely, any set is a member of a set.
We now formalize the notions of several types of classes to be used. These are: relations, functions, and operators. They
are illustrated by the nest of concepts shown in Fig. 2.2, the outermost member of which is comprised of the classes.
Inside of classes is the collection of relations. A relation is a class consisting of ordered pairs of sets.
Inside of relations is the collection of functions. A function is a relation with the graph property: namely, if (x, y) and
(x, z), both being ordered pairs of sets in a relation F , implies that y = z, then F is said to have the graph property.
Inside of functions is the collection of operators. An operator O is a function whose domain is the class of all sets. An
operator is a relation, since Ox is the unique y so that (x, y) ∈ O .
3. The Russell operator, operator syntax and semantics, Semantic Thesis, axioms
In this section we supply syntax and semantics for some operators of relevance for our axiomatic treatment of con-
sciousness. We start in Section 3.1 with the characterization of the Russell operator, since it plays a central role. Then
in Section 3.2, we introduce a relevant collection of operators and develop mathematical properties (syntax) for them. In
Section 3.3, we state the Semantic Thesis that characterizes consciousness as the action of operators on experience. Con-
sciousness and experience are introduced as primitives, and an open axiom system for them is elaborated. The axioms are
accompanied by semantic characterizations of the associated operators.
3.1. The Russell operator
The Russell operator R plays a special role in the syntax and semantics of the development of the Semantic Thesis. R is
deﬁned by its action on a set A as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1. RA = {x ∈ A | x /∈ x}.
3 Proofs that follow directly from deﬁnitions are omitted throughout.
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deﬁnition of a selector (operator) will be given in Deﬁnition 3.13. R is a special case of a generic operator O P speciﬁed in
terms of a predicate P (y) as
O P A = {y ∈ A | P (y)}. (3.1)
We recognize this as the Z-F Axiom of Comprehension. So O P A is a bona ﬁde set. It follows that
x ⊆ y ⇒ O P x = x∩ O P y. (3.2)
This relation holds in particular for O P taken equal to R.
The Russell paradox is no longer relevant as a paradox. It is replaced by the operator R as examination of the proof of
the following theorem reveals (compare (2.1)).
Theorem 3.2. ∀A, RA /∈ A. Moreover, RA is normal.
Proof. Assume there exists a set z such that Rz ∈ z. Then by the deﬁnition of R there are two options, both of which lead
to contradictions. Namely,
1. Rz ∈ Rz, in which case Rz /∈ Rz,
2. Rz /∈ Rz, in which case Rz ∈ Rz. 
A corresponding result is
Proposition 3.3. ∀A, A /∈ RA.
Proof. By deﬁnition, if x ∈ RA, then it is both true that x /∈ x and x ∈ A. Then A ∈ RA implies both A /∈ A and A ∈ A, a
contradiction. 
We make the following observations associated with Theorem 3.2.
(a) The collection of all sets is not itself a set.
(b) Every set has an inside and an outside, where the inside of a set consists of its elements.
(c) The complement of a set (the class of sets not in the given set) is not a set.
(d) If ∀y ∈ B , y /∈ y, then B /∈ B .
(e) If ∀y ∈ C , y ∈ y, we cannot conclude that C ∈ C .
Since R takes a part of A outside itself, note the relevance of (b) to the ability to observe a set from the outside, a
feature described in Section 1. To illustrate (e) we ﬁrst introduce the notion of the dual of a set.
Deﬁnition 3.4. The dual x∗ of the set x is given by
x∗ = {x∗, x}. (3.3)
Existence and uniqueness of the dual of a set follows from the AFA. (e) is illustrated by the following two examples.
Example 1: Since Ω ∈ Ω , taking C = Ω satisﬁes the hypothesis of (e), and we have C ∈ C .
Example 2: Take x and y to be unequal normal sets, and let C = {x∗, y∗}. Then it Is easy to see that C /∈ C .
Let U = {x | x = x} be the class of sets. (U is also referred to as the universe of sets.) Let N = {x | x /∈ x} be the class of
normal sets, and let A = {x | x ∈ x} be the class of abnormal sets. Then we have the following proposition concerning the
classes A, N and U and the Russell operator R.
Proposition 3.5.
(a) N is a proper class.
(b) U is a proper class.
(c) A is a proper class.
(d) U = N ∪ A.
(e) RA = N ∩ A, ∀A.
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(a) Assume not. Then N = A for some set A. RA /∈ A by Theorem 3.2. But then RA ∈ N , a contradiction.
(b) Assume not. Then U = B for some set B . Now {x ∈ B | x /∈ x} is a set by the Axiom of Comprehension. However
{x ∈ B | x /∈ x} = N by deﬁnition. This is a contradiction since N is a proper class.
(c) Suppose to the contrary that A is a set. Then there exists a unique a set A such that x ∈ A ⇔ x ∈ x. Then using AFA,
we see that ∀y ∈ N , y∗ ∈ A. Let
C = {x ∈ A | ∃y ∈ N such that x = y∗}.
C is itself a set (Axiom of Comprehension) that we can also write as
C = {y∗ | y ∈ N } = {{y∗, y} | y ∈ N }. (3.4)
Then using the Z-F Axiom of Union, we can write
⋃
C =
⋃
y /∈y
{y∗, y}, (3.5)
where
⋃
on the left is the monadic union operator.4 Then
R
(⋃
C
)
=
⋃
y /∈y
{y} = N . (3.6)
This is a contradiction, since R(⋃C) is a set and N is a proper class. 
3.2. Syntax
3.2.1. Fundamental operators
We shall employ the following four basic dyadic set operations ◦, ∪, ∩, −, deﬁned as follows.
◦: (O 1 ◦ O 2)x = O 1O 2x,
∪: (O 1 ∪ O 2)x = (O 1x) ∪ (O 2x),
∩: (O 1 ∩ O 2)x = (O 1x) ∩ (O 2x),
−: (O 1 − O 2)x = (O 1x) − (O 2x). (3.7)
The last, the difference of operators, is deﬁned in terms of set subtraction, given by the following Boolean rule:
x− y = x− (x∩ y). (3.8)
The associative law (O 1O 2)O 3 = O 1(O 2O 3) follows from the deﬁnition of ◦.
To supplement R we introduce four additional basic operators I , E , B and D, where
(a) I is the identity operator, Ix = x,
(b) E is the elimination operator, Ex = ∅,
(c) B is the singleton operator, Bx = {x}, and
(d) D is the duality operator, x∗ = Dx = {x∗, x}. (See Deﬁnition 3.4.)
While we defer introduction of semantics for the basic operators until Section 5, we make the following observations
about them.
(i) IO = OI , for any operator O.
(ii) E is not a right-zero operator, since for example, BE = E . Note that E is idempotent (E2 = E ). Note also that (BE)x =
B∅, so that in particular, (BnE)x = Bn∅ for any non-negative integer n.
(iii) Since {x, y} = {x} ∪ {y}, showing that {x, y} is a derivative notion (see (a) in Section 2.2), we can write
x∗ = (Bx∗) ∪ Bx. (3.9)
The operators B and D are related as follows.
D = (BD) ∪ B. (3.10)
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Multiplication table for the basic operators.
E I R B
E E E E E
I E I R B
R E R R RB
B BE B BR BB
3.2.2. Properties of the basic operators
The quadruple of basic operators B, E , I and R form a non-closed system illustrated in the operator multiplication table
(Table 3.1).
Next we introduce the counter-Russell operator, T = I − R. Note that
T A = A − RA = A ∩ A. (3.11)
Consider the following proposition relating R and T to normal and abnormal sets.
Proposition 3.6. Let B be a normal set and C an abnormal set. Then RBB = BB, but RBC = ∅. Alternatively, T BC = BC but
T BB = ∅.
We also have the following proposition exhibiting properties of R and B.
Proposition 3.7.
(i) x ∈ A ⇔ Bx ⊂ A.
(ii) RA /∈ A ⇔ BRA ⊂ A.
(iii) RA /∈ RA.
By Deﬁnition 2.2, RA is normal. Additional syntactic relations (conceptual operator statements) are given in the following
theorem, proposition and corollary.
Theorem 3.8.
(a) I ∩ R = R.
(b) B ∩ R = E .
(c) I ∩ (BR) = E .
(d) I ∩ (RB) = E .
(e) RB = B − I .
(f) RB − BR = E . BR − RB = E .
The two statements in (f) are not the same since there is no monadic minus for sets. Examples illustrating the two
relations in (f) are (RB − BR)BD∅ = ∅ and (BR − RB)Ω = ∅, respectively.
Proposition 3.9. RBR = BR.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Propositions 3.6 and 3.7. 
Corollary 3.10. (RB − BR)R = E , and (BR − RB)R = E .
This corollary gives a connection between Proposition 3.9 and relation (f) in Theorem 3.8.
3.2.3. Characterization of R
The following proposition and corollary gives a complete characterization of R.
Proposition 3.11. If
x ⊆ y ⇒ Ox = x∩ O y, (3.12)
then OB uniquely determines O .
4 The monadic union operator
⋃
is deﬁned as follows:
⋃
A = {x | x ∈ a for some a ∈ A}, which is a set by virtue of the Axiom of Union.
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∀x, Ox = {y ∈ x | OBy = By}. (3.13)
Proof of Proposition 3.11. We make the following two preliminary observations. (i) The hypothesis implies that ∀x, Ox ⊆ x,
and hence that (ii) O 2x = Ox ∩ Ox = Ox. Continuing we now address the question: when is y ∈ Ox? However y ∈ Ox ⇔
By ⊆ Ox, by deﬁnition. In the hypothesis we may replace x with By and y with Ox to conclude that
OBy = By ∩ O (Ox) = By ∩ Ox, (3.14)
the last employing (ii). Now By ⊆ Ox ⇔ By ∩ Ox = By by deﬁnition. This and (3.13) implies y ∈ Ox if and only if
OBy = By. (3.15)
From this and (i) we conclude that y ∈ Ox ⇔ y ∈ x and OBy = By. 
Corollary 3.12. Let the operators O 1 and O 2 satisfy the hypothesis of the proposition, and let O 1B = O 2B. Then O 1 = O 2 .
The notion of an operator called a selector (compare Deﬁnition 3.1(f)) is speciﬁed as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.13. A class of operators called selectors5 are those that satisfy the hypothesis x ⊆ y ⇒ Ox = x ∩ O y of Proposi-
tion 3.11.
Selectors form a commutative system, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 3.14. If O 1 and O 2 are selectors, then O 2O 1 = O 1O 2 = O 1 ∩ O 2 .
Proof. Let z = O 1x ⊆ x. Then O 2z = z ∩ O 2x. Then O 2(O 1x) = (O 1x) ∩ O 2x = O 1x∩ O 2x = (O 1 ∩ O 2)x. 
In particular, consciousness operators K to be introduced in Section 3.3, being selectors, commute. Theorem 3.8(f) pro-
vides an example of a non-commuting pair of operators.
Characterization of the Russell operator is the subject of the following theorem.
Theorem 3.15. R is characterized by the following two properties.
1. x ⊆ y ⇒ Rx = x∩ Ry.
2. RB = B − I. (3.16)
Proof. #1 follows from (3.2). #2 is the result of Theorem 3.8(e). Then the proof of the characterization R of is an immediate
consequence of Proposition 3.11 and Corollary 3.12. 
3.2.4. Schematic illustrating syntax of sets and operators
The Venn type diagram in Fig. 3.1 illustrates some of the notions being discussed. The diagram is intended to be com-
posed in a homeomorphic representation of the Euclidean plane. In the diagram sets and classes are represented by open
rectangles. That is, they do not contain their boundaries. For example, in terms of the rectangular coordinates α and β in
the plane, the empty set is given by ∅ = {α,β | α2 + β2 < 02}.
The class of abnormal sets is represented by the largest shaded rectangle. The class of normal sets is represented by the
largest unshaded rectangle. A set’s name is displayed at the tail of an arrow pointing to that set. To interpret the diagram,
consider the large rectangle A in the middle of the ﬁgure. A is placed in a general position, that is, so that some of its
elements are abnormal (shaded) and some are normal. F is a subset of A. C (toward the lower right) is a set all of whose
elements are normal, and G is a subset of C . D (upper right) is a set all of whose elements are abnormal, and H is a subset
of D . The remaining sets indicate the result of applying one or more operators to the sets and subsets just identiﬁed.
Illustrated in Fig. 3.1 are 6 possibilities for sets and 7 for fundamental operators:
2 for A, depending on whether BA ⊆ A or not. (See the phrase “only one” in the ﬁgure.)
1 for set C , namely, BC ⊂ C .
2 for D , depending on whether BD ⊆ D or not. (See the phrase “only one” in the ﬁgure.)
1 for ∅, a technical possibility, since ∅ cannot be illustrated.
5 Thanks to the referee for noting that a notion of selector occurs in relational databases.
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The 7 illustrated fundamental operators are E , I , B, R, T , BR, and RB, although E , I and T are illustrated implicitly.
The conclusions (a)–(d) of Theorem 3.8 are illustrated in the ﬁgure by the sets and/or labels of sets that are pointed
to by dashed arrows with the corresponding labels. These labels are placed in the margins of the ﬁgure. For example, the
(c) conclusion in the left-hand margin labels both a dashed arrow pointing to the set BRA and a dashed arrow pointing to
the label of the set A. These two sets, shown as disjoint in the ﬁgure, illustrate conclusion (c) of the theorem. One can see
that conclusions (e) and (f) are also illustrated as close examination of the ﬁgure shows. The result
x ⊆ y ⇒ Rx = x∩ Ry, (3.17)
following from (3.2) showing that R is a selector is illustrated in its three different cases.
1. RF , the part of F in N equals F ∩ RA.
2. H ⊆ D ∈ A then RH = ∅.
3. G ⊆ C ∈ N then RG = G ∩ C = G.
3.3. Semantics and consciousness operators
We now develop a model in which experience and consciousness are taken as primitives. These primitives may be com-
posed of layers. In this case, our primitives model the corresponding basic layers, namely what we have knowledge and
understanding about through our sensations and perceptions (this last being a Cantor-like statement). When necessary for
clarity, the basic layers shall be called primary experience and primary consciousness, respectively. While we perceive these
basic layers, they are essentially ineffable. The higher layers, should they exist, might very well be beyond ineffability. We
focus on the basic layers, and we take our primitives to be models of them. Our goal is to specify an illuminating axiomatic
system for these primitives. So we may say that as with set theory, we commence with a Cantor-like (naïve) manner and
then reﬁne it by means of an axiomatic approach.
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First three axioms for a consciousness operator.
Axiom Semantic interpretation of the axiom Name of axiom
a) ∀x, Kx ⊆ x Experience generates its own awareness Generation
b) ∀x, x /∈ Kx Awareness does not generate the primary experience Irreversibility
c) ∀x, Kx /∈ x Awareness is removed from experience Removal
Table 3.3
Algebraic statements of the ﬁrst three axioms for a consciousness operator.
Algebraic statement Violating examples
a) O ∩ I = O O = B
b) B ∩ O = E O = B,T
c) (BO ) ∩ I = E O = E,B,I
Table 3.4
The fourth consciousness operator axiom.
d) If x ⊆ y, then
Kx = x∩ Ky
Awareness of a sub-experience is determined by the
sub-experience and awareness of the primary experience
Selection
We shall characterize a collection of operators called consciousness operators, the generic element of which is denoted
by K. We take a set x to model a primary experience. Such a set, being a primitive, may be viewed as a Platonic object.
Then our Semantic Thesis is stated as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.16 (Semantic Thesis). Consciousness is a result of a consciousness operator being applied to experience.
We now give the ﬁrst four axioms of an open (and developing) system that serves to characterize the experience and
consciousness primitives. The axioms and their semantic interpretations justify the Semantic Thesis. We begin with the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.17. Let x model a primary experience. Then Kx models the awareness, an induced experience. Consciousness is an
instance of a speciﬁc operator K acting on experience.
The ﬁrst three axioms along with their semantic interpretations and a name for each are displayed in Table 3.2.
Axioms (a) and (b) are motivated by the properties of the Russell operator (a) and (b), respectively given in Theorem 3.8.
Using axioms (a) and (c) in Table 3.2, we conclude that a set of the form Kx is normal. This may be interpreted semantically
as the normality of awareness.
The following analytic statement of axiom (c)
(BKx) ∩ x = ∅ (3.18)
follows by noting that y /∈ x and y ⊆ x implies y /∈ y.
Table 3.3 displays algebraic statements of these axioms along with examples of operators that violate each statement.
The existence of Ω shows that B and I violate (c).
We now append a fourth axiom that in fact is stronger than axiom (a) (see Table 3.4).
Axiom (d) is motivated by its syntactic counterpart expressed by the condition (3.12) of Proposition 3.11. Axiom (d) is
the statement that K is a selector.
The consistency of the axioms (a)–(d) is demonstrated by producing an operator that satisﬁes all of them. Indeed, R is
such an operator as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 3.18. The Russell operator R satisﬁes the axioms (a), (b), (c) and (d).
Proof. The proof follows from properties of R assembled in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
The following result describes the action of K on the primary experience B∅.
Proposition 3.19. KBE = BE .
Proof. Axiom (c) implies that KBE∅ = BE∅. Axiom (a) implies that KB∅ ⊆ B∅. Together these two statements imply that
KB∅ = B∅. 
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shows.
Cx = {y ∈ x | y /∈ y; ∀z ∈ y, z = Ω}. (3.19)
So since all elements of Cx are normal, Cx is a normal set. Moreover Cx ⊆ Rx, so that C is a sub-operator of R. To show
that C = R note that for the set A = {{∅,Ω}}, we have RA = A, but C A = ∅. To show that C satisﬁes the axioms, we
proceed as follows.
(a) By deﬁnition Cx ⊆ x, so axiom (a) is satisﬁed.
(b) Since Cx ⊆ Rx and x /∈ Rx, then x /∈ Cx. So axiom (b) is satisﬁed.
(c) To prove that C satisﬁes axiom (c), we show the algebraic equivalent axiom (c). Namely that BC ∩ I = E . Then suppose
∃z such that Cz ∈ z. There are two options.
1. Cz ∈ Cz. This implies that Cz /∈ Cz, a contradiction, since by deﬁnition every element of Cx is normal.
2. Cz /∈ Cz. This implies that either Cz ∈ Cz or Ω ∈ Cz. Hence Cz /∈ Cz implies Ω ∈ Cz. However Ω ∈ Ω , contradicting
the normality of Cz.
(d) (3.2) shows that C satisﬁes axiom (d).
While the axioms of a consciousness operator appear to be limiting, we are able to exhibit an inﬁnite collection “{KA |
A ∈ U}” of such operators. In particular generalizing (3.19) yields the following.
KAx = {y ∈ x | y /∈ y,T (y ∩ A) = ∅}. (3.20)
Comments on a connection of qualia to a diagonalization of KA are given in Section 6.
4. Labeling of graphs, histogram construction, M-Z equation, neural networks
We begin with a prescription for labeling a collection (Section 2.1). This is extended to a technique for decorating a
labeled graph. Given a graph, this procedure forms the basis for inducing the existence of a set intrinsically associated with a
labeled graph. Then a construction of what we call a histogram is made. The latter is a novel tool used in proposing the M-Z
equation, which comes from a synthesis of Aczel’s theory of decorating labeled graphs and the theory of neural networks.
An interpretation is made that portrays the sets decorating a labeled graph as Platonic constructs. So this application and
interpretation constitute a theory of consciousness constructed on the foundations developed here.
4.1. Labeling of graphs
A labeling λ of Γ is a set valued function of the nodes N of Γ .
a → λa, ∀a ∈ N. (4.1)
A decoration of a labeled graph is a set valued function a → dλa, where (compare (2.2))
dλa = {dλb | a → b} ∪ λa, ∀a ∈ N. (4.2)
This system of equations along with the following theorem shows how labeled decorations are a basis for inducing the ex-
istence of a set intrinsically associated with the labeled graph. (Compare the notion of the picture of a graph in Section 2.2.)
Existence and uniqueness of dλ is the subject of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Given Γ = (N, E, λ), a corresponding decoration dλ of Γ exists and is unique ([1], Theorem 1.10). (Compare with AFA
in Section 2.2.)
Example. Take Γ = (N, E) to be the graph of the set Ω . Γ is speciﬁed by N = {a} and E = {a → a}. Then with λa being any
set, we have
dλa = {dλa} ∪ λa. (4.3)
If λa = {b}, a singleton, then dλa = {dλa,b}. Then dλa = b∗ = Db is the dual of b.
4.2. The histogram construction
We now introduce a construct called the histogram of a function that replaces a set valued function on a collection by
a set valued function on a pure set. The construct is used to apply Theorem 4.1 to a collection of graphs abstracted from
models of brain circuitry to be introduced in Section 4.4.
Let A be a collection of unknown elements, and let B be a set. Consider a mapping, f : A → B , and deﬁne
f −1(b) = {a ∈ A | f (a) = b}, ∀b ∈ B. (4.4)
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We suppose that the number of elements in this set, | f −1(b)| is ﬁnite for every b. Then the histogram of a mapping is
speciﬁed as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Histogram). The histogram H f of f is the following set of ordered pairs.
H f =
{(
b,
∣∣ f −1(b)∣∣) | b ∈ B, f −1(b) = ∅}. (4.5)
Note that H f is a bona ﬁde set (see Section 2.1), and in particular, that H f ⊆ B ×N+ .
4.3. The M-Z equation, the weight function, the voltage function
We call a function w : E → Q, a weight function. The rationals Q comprise a set, since each non-zero rational number q
corresponds to the triple (m,n,±), where ±m/n (m and n being relatively prime natural numbers) is the value of q. The
choice of the rationals for the range of w is made for deﬁniteness and clarity.
Let Ea denote the set of edges of a graph Γ that terminate in the node a, that is,
Ea =
{
(p,a) | p ∈ N, p → a}, ∀a ∈ N. (4.6)
We make the following local ﬁniteness hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4.3. ∀a, Ea is ﬁnite.
Then let6 wa = w|Ea , so that wa : Ea → Q is a function from a ﬁnite unordered collection into the rationals.
Let Hwa be the histogram of the mapping wa . Hwa is a ﬁnite set since Ea is a ﬁnite collection. Note that
Hwa ⊆ Q×N+. (4.7)
We now deﬁne the M-Z equation.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (M-Z equation). Given Γ = (N, E,w), label Γ with the labeling λ :a → Hwa . Then the labeled decoration of Γ
is speciﬁed by the M-Z equation, namely
dλa = {dλb | a → b} ∪ Hwa , ∀a ∈ N. (4.8)
Comparing (4.8) to (2.2) where a decoration is deﬁned, we may interpret the set Hwa as a forcing term in the M-Z
equation for the decoration dλa. In a forthcoming work [22], a number of examples and applications of the M-Z equation is
assembled.
We shall be interested in an extension of the above development that involves what we call a voltage function v :N →
{0,1}. (The choice of {0,1} is made for deﬁniteness and clarity.) Take
Ea,v =
{
(p,a) | p → a, v(p) = 1}, ∀a ∈ N, (4.9)
and let wa,v = w|Ea,v . Note that the histogram Hwa,v = ∅ if Ea,v = ∅. Now label Γ with the labeling λ :a → Hwa,v . Then
the M-Z equation that speciﬁes the labeled decoration of Γ = (N, E,w, v) is given by (4.8) with Hwa replaced by Hwa,v .
Namely,
dλa = {dλb | a → b} ∪ Hwa,v , ∀a ∈ N. (4.10)
In Fig. 4.1 we give a schematic of the process of labeling a neuron with a histogram.
Recall that the histogram is constructed ignoring the numbering of the efferents.
6 Recall that f |y denotes the restriction of a mapping f to a sub-collection y of the domain of f .
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4.4. Application to a neural network model of brain circuitry
The brain is commonly taken as the seat of consciousness, the latter supervening on the workings of the brain’s neural
networks. (While for some, it is the entire physical body and even the environment that is taken as the seat of conscious-
ness, there is no loss of meaning for our argument to take the more limited view.) We shall show how our constructs apply
to a neural network to produce a labeled decorated graph. This in turn allows us to incorporate neural networks into the
mathematical foundation of consciousness. Take a neuron Q and trace its inputs (afferents) backward and its outputs (ef-
ferents) forward to elaborate a neural network. Replacing a neuron and its dendritic and axonal processes by a node and its
synapses by directed edges, there results a graph Γ emanating from the node (also called Q ) corresponding to the chosen
neuron. Typically this network has reentrant connections, and so, Γ is non-well-founded. An illustration of a possible Γ
fragment is given in Fig. 4.2. Note the correspondence to the cords and knots of Kanger [20].
This network and so also Γ is associated with two families of parameters, namely, the synaptic weights w and the output
of its neurons’ activities. The latter are expressed as voltages, denoted v . Hebb’s rule is the customary model of synaptic
weight change. The changes in voltage outputs are modeled by input–output threshold equations, the simplest version of
which is the McCulloch–Pitts model [15]. For clarity, we employ the simplest meaningful form of these two models, using
them to specify updates of w and v , the latter written as wold(a → b) update−−−−→ wnew(a → b) and vold(a) update−−−−→ vnew(a),
respectively.
Deﬁnition 4.5 (Hebb’s rule).
wnew(a → b) − wold(a → b) = αvold(a)vnew(b). (4.11)
In (4.11), a is an efferent neuron, b is a corresponding afferent and w(a → b) is the weight of the synapse connecting
neuron a to neuron b. (For convenience we allow at most one such connection per pair of neurons.) The voltage v(a) is the
neuronal activity of a. For consistency with Section 4.3, the scaling constant α is chosen to be a rational number.
Deﬁnition 4.6 (McCulloch–Pitts equation).
vnew(a) = h
( ∑
p:p→a
wold(p → a)vold(p) − θ
)
. (4.12)
In (4.12) h is the Heaviside function, the real number θ is a threshold, and the sum is over all neurons p that forward
connect directly to neuron a.
Note that (4.11) and (4.12) form a coupled dynamical system.
4.4.1. Neural state, its decoration. The Neural Net Semantic Thesis
At any instant of time, the coupled dynamical system (4.11) and (4.12) may be viewed as specifying the current states of
the functions v and w . We use the term neural state to describe this instantaneous state of the neural assembly. Referring to
the weight and voltage functions of Section 4.3, we use the v and w to specify a labeling, λw,v :a → Hwa,v of the graph Γ
as described in that section. Then we may use (4.10) to specify a labeled decoration, dλw,v of Γ . We shall also refer to dλw,v
as the labeled decoration of the corresponding neural state. We now state our Neural Net Semantic Thesis. (See the Semantic
Thesis of Deﬁnition 3.16.)
Deﬁnition 4.7 (Neural Net Semantic Thesis). Each value of the Platonic function dλw,v encodes a dynamic preconscious expe-
rience associated with the corresponding neuron (i.e., node of Γ ).
As the brain processes information, the weights and voltages change as characterized by the Hebbian dynamics and the
Mc-P dynamics. These in turn inform changes in associated preconscious experiences.
4.4.2. Platonism
Neural networks are physical, that is, they may be observed and their weights and voltages can be measured. The set
values of the labeled decorations dλw,v are not physical.
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Fig. 4.3. (a) Neural state with neurons a, b, c. (b) Corresponding APG with point Θ .
Fig. 4.4. The theses of consciousness. The shading demarks the Platonic realm.
Since they are located in some virtual space, we regard a value of dλw,v as Platonic.
(Compare Schrödinger’s quote in Section 1.)
If Γ is well-founded, its labeled decoration can be constructed in a recursive manner [1]. However while the AFA sup-
plies an existence statement for the decoration of a non-well-founded graph, it does not give a method to construct that
decoration. The universe of graphs is divisible into two parts, one in which labeled decorations are recursively computable
and the complement. The computability for graphs in the ﬁrst part is a reason for classifying these corresponding sets as
physical and not Platonic. The non-computability of graphs in the second part reinforces their Platonic status.
4.4.3. Example: A neural state instantiating a concept; Memes and themata
Consider the model neural network in Fig. 4.3a composed of three McCulloch–Pitts neurons, a, b, c with the synaptic
weights wba , wca , wbc (where for example, wba denotes w(a → b)) and with the voltages v(a) = v(c) = 0 and v(b) = 1.
With these data and with the time frozen, the network becomes what we have called a neural state. When the APG (shown
in Fig. 4.3b) associated with this neural state is appropriately labeled with the speciﬁed weight and voltage data and then
decorated, the diagram in Fig. 4.3b, a picture of a particular set Θ results. Since the source voltages vanish, the histograms
are empty. Then for the sets of the decoration, we have Θ = {B,C}, where B = ∅ and C = {∅}.
The diagram in Fig. 4.3b, illustrating a decorated labeled APG, arises from the neural state in Fig. 4.3a. The APG in
Fig. 4.3b is a representation of the Von Neumann ordinal 2, so that this APG is an instantiation of the ordinal 2. (A number
of additional examples are found in [22], where concepts and their instantiations are termed memes [21], and where the
instantiation of an interpretation of a concept as a set is called the thema of that concept (of that meme)). We see that
the set Θ decorating the point is the thema of the meme instantiated by this APG. The thema Θ along with the diagram
in Fig. 4.3a are Platonic instantiations. The corresponding actual neural state being modeled (as by the model in Fig. 4.3a)
is physical instantiation of that meme. The neural state (as illustrated in Fig. 4.3a) and the APGs (such as illustrated in
Fig. 4.3b) are only examples of a vast number (in principle an unbounded number) of neural states and corresponding APGs
that have this same thema Θ . All such APGs are pictures of the set Θ , so by analogy, we might say that each such meme
whose thema is Θ is a picture of Θ .
4.5. Correspondence of the semantic theses, a neuro-physiological thesis
The relationship among the semantic theses of Sections 3.3 and 4.4 is shown in Fig. 4.4. Each arrow in Fig. 4.4 describes
a ﬂow of information. The lowest arrow is a ﬂow of physical information. The second is a ﬂow from physical to Platonic
information. The highest is a ﬂow of psychic (Platonic) information. Fig. 4.4 portrays the following notion.
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Semantic interpretations of basic operators.
Op. Syntactic Semantic Interpretation Axiom(s)
E Elimination Erasing/Forgetting Erases set representing Platonic experience Existence of ∅
I Identity Accepting/Receiving Leaves set unchanged Extension
B Brace Conceiving Creates higher order set (a singleton) out of a set Pair and singleton
R Russell Perceiving Bifurcates set contents & retains normal elements Comprehension
T Anti-Russell Rejecting/Denying Counters R, retaining the abnormal elements Union
D Duality Reinforcing/Elaborating Elaborates the concept of a set AFA
Fig. 5.1. Consciousness: Syntactic and semantic views of the processing from the physical to the virtual. Shading distinguishes the ideal Platonic realm from
the physical.
Deﬁnition 4.8 (Neuro-physiological thesis). The neuro-physiological thesis (Fig. 4.4, lower left), denotes the movement of sen-
sory information from a sense organ to the brain where it is processed to frame an internal physical representation of that
information, and from where a primitive called consciousness is made manifest in a virtual space.
Note a parallel between the information ﬂow in Fig. 4.4 with Plato’s line of knowledge [24].
5. Observations: syntactic and semantic nomenclature
In this section we shall develop an elaboration of the consciousness operators introduced in Section 3.3 by exploiting
aspects of the constructs developed in Section 4. The fundamental operators of set theory introduced in Section 3.2.1 will
contribute as well. This elaboration will provide additional applications of the theory presented here. This is motivated by
the syntactic and semantic nomenclature ascribed to these operators, which is summarized in Table 5.1. Also shown in this
table is an interpretation of each operator along with the axiom(s) that the operator codiﬁes.
In Fig. 5.1 we schematize the ﬂow of information from sensory input to conscious experience. The upper boxes describe
the syntactic level, the lower the semantic. A neural network in the brain typically corresponds to a non-well-founded
graph. Hopﬁeld networks supply examples. The corresponding labeled decorations are not recursively computable. They are
schematized in the box labeled “Functions dλ with values in virtual sets” in Fig. 5.1. Is it a time dependent one of these
decorations that emerges into consciousness? If so, how is the corresponding neural network selected?
6. Future directions
6.1. Applications of the M-Z equation
In ongoing work [22] numerous examples of applications of the M-Z equation are developed in the context of neural net-
work modeling of brain circuitry. In particular the development of the notion of memes (i.e., concepts that are represented
by pictures) and their themata (Platonic interpretations or themes of a concept collection) brieﬂy introduced in Section 4.4.1
is made and complemented with examples. That work is extended to multi-graphs, a more faithful model of brain circuitry.
Then a notion of histogram dynamics (Section 4.2) is introduced as a way to study the discrete time dependence of the as-
sociated notions of awareness and consciousness. Abstractions of those dynamics are developed as a tool for their study. The
non-well-founded set theoretic framework that provides the context of these developments leads to a notion of a hierarchy
of perceptual realities that we expect will inform understanding of the features of consciousness.
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We propose to study the diagonalization Kdiag , of the family of operators KA introduced in (3.20). The diagonalization is
speciﬁed as follows.
Kdiagx = {y ∈ x | y /∈ y, and ∀z ∈ x∩ y, z /∈ z}. (6.1)
Kdiag satisﬁes axioms (a)–(c) of Section 3.2. However taking A1 = {{∅,Ω}} and A2 = {∅,Ω, {∅,Ω}} as two choices for A
in (3.20), it follows that Kdiag A is not a subset of Kdiag B . So failing axiom (d) precludes Kdiag from being a consciousness
operator. Nevertheless we expect Kdiag to be an operator of interest. For instance, take the set dλa speciﬁed by the M-Z
equation in (4.8) and put a equal to p, the point of a graph, that graph corresponding to a neural network. If this neural
network is the neural correlate of a quale,7 we ascribe the semantics of that quale to the Platonic set Kdλpdλp, itself located
in a virtual space. This quale is positioned in the rightmost box in Fig. 5.1.
6.3. Evolution
The characterization of the dynamics of memes (set pictures) and themata (the sets that are pictured) as an adaptive
process, employing such Darwinian concepts as competition, selection, reproduction as well as ﬁtness and genomics is also
the subject of ongoing work [21] that ﬁnds motivation in the foundations developed here. We expect that variations of our
development will provide mathematical foundations for the study of evolution driven by so-called selﬁsh replicators, both
genetic and mimetic [9,6].
6.4. Other directions
1. Study of the bisimulation of graphs, a notion that characterizes when two memes share a thema. We expect this to lead
to a mathematical theory of memes and themata.
2. Model theoretic foundations of Aczel theory dealing with the consistency of the AFA with the Z-F Axioms from which
FA has been deleted [5], [1].
3. Study of the algebra of the set theoretic operators generated by the fundamental operators appearing in Table 3.1. An
example of such an operator is I ∪BR.
4. Classiﬁcation of the consciousness operators K and the connection of such a classiﬁcation to Gödel’s Incompleteness
Theorem.
5. Examples and applications of the M-Z equation.
6. Application of these foundations to the grammar of programming languages.
7. Study of the trajectories generated by iterating application of a consciousness operator.
Appendix A. Axioms of Set Theory [1], [5], [12], [18], [19], [28], [30]
We make explicit use of the following axioms of set theory.
Existence: ∃z(z = z).
Extensionality: ∀z(z ∈ a ↔ z ∈ b) → a = b.
Pairing: ∃z[a ∈ z&b ∈ z].
Union: ∃z(∀x ∈ a)(∀y ∈ x)(y ∈ z).
Comprehension: ∃z∀x[x ∈ z ↔ x ∈ a&ϕ(x)].
Here ϕ can be any formula in which the variable z does not occur free.
Except for the axiom of existence these axioms along with the Axioms of Inﬁnity, Collection, Power Set and Choice can
be found in [1]. We do not state the latter four axioms since we use them only implicitly. Note that Aczel uses the name
Axiom of Separation for the Axiom of Comprehension. The FA is stated as follows.
Axiom of Foundation: ∃x(x ∈ a) → (∃x ∈ a)(∀y ∈ x)¬(y ∈ a).
The FA is not included in the original Z-F list. It was proposed by Von Neumann [28]. We don’t use the FA, and we replace
it by the AFA stated as follows.
Anti-foundation Axiom: Every graph has a unique decoration.
7 A quale is the perception of a color, an aroma. . . , or the perception of a feeling, such as hunger, fear. . . . The neural correlate of a quale is the neural
circuitry in the brain that is active when the quale is perceived. Some attribute the location of the quale to this circuitry.
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References
[1] P. Aczel, Non-Well-Founded Sets, CSLI Publications, 1988.
[2] I. Aleksander, B. Dunmall, Axioms and tests for the presence of minimal consciousness in agents, in: O. Holland (Ed.), Machine Consciousness, Imprint
Acad., 2003.
[3] Aristotle, in: D. Ross (Ed.), De Anima, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1961.
[4] J. Barwise, in the forward to [1].
[5] P. Bernays, A system of axiomatic set theory, VII, J. Symbolic Logic 19 (1954) 81–86.
[6] S. Blackmore, The Meme Machine, Oxford Univ. Press, 1999.
[7] G. Cantor, Beiträge zur Begründung der Transﬁniten Mengenlehre, 1, Mathematische Annalen 46 (1895) 481–512.
[8] R. Courant, H. Robbins, What is Mathematics, 1941.
[9] R. Dawkins, The Selﬁsh Gene, Oxford University, 1976.
[10] R. Descartes, Discours sur la Methode, 1637.
[11] H. Dym, H. McKean, Fourier Series and Integrals, Academic Press, 1972.
[12] A. Fränkel, Zu den Grundlagender Cantor–Zermeloschen Mengenlehre, Mathematische Annalen 86 (1922) 230–237.
[13] G. Frege, Grundsetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, vol. 1, Jena, 1893, vol. 2, 1903.
[14] K. Gödel, see [19].
[15] S. Haykin, Neural Networks a Comprehensive Foundation, Prentice-Hall, 1999.
[16] D. Hilbert, Address to the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris, 1900;
See also Kaplansky, Hilbert’s Problems, University of Chicago, 1977.
[17] D. Hofstadter, Gödel Escher Bach; An Eternal Golden Braid, 1979.
[18] K. Hrbacek, Introduction to Set Theory, M. Dekker, 1999.
[19] T. Jech, Set Theory, Springer, 2002.
[20] S. Kanger, Provability in Logic, Stockholm Studies in Philosophy, Univ. of Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1957.
[21] W. Miranker, Memes and their Themata, Yale Univ. DCS TR-1404, 2009.
[22] W. Miranker, G. Zuckerman, Dynamics of Mental Activity, Yale Univ. DCS TR1414, 2009.
[23] R. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind, Oxford Univ. Press, 1989.
[24] Plato, The Republic, 360 BCE (Translated by B. Jowett).
[25] B. Russell, A. Whitehead, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 1910–1913.
[26] E. Schrödinger, Mind and Matter, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958.
[27] M. Solms, Chromosomes on the couch, Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy 9 (1995) 107–120.
[28] J. Von Neumann, Eine Axiomatisierung der Mengenlehre, Jurnal für Reine und Angewandte Mathematik 155 (1925) 219–240.
[29] A. Whitehead, see [25].
[30] E. Zermelo, Untersuchung uber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre, I, Mathematische Annalen 65 (1908) 261–281.
Glossary8
Terminology
Experience/primary experience: a set x/primary layer when there are layers of experience (Def. 3.17)
Consciousness: Kx, where K is a consciousness operator. See Semantic Thesis in Section 3.2 (Def. 3.16)
Awareness: Kx, where K is a consciousness operator. See Semantic Thesis in Section 3.2 (Def. 3.17)
Graph: a collection of nodes with certain pairs of the nodes speciﬁed as edges (Section 2.2)
Directed graph: a graph in which the nodal pairs are ordered (edges are directed) (Section 2.2)
Pointed graph: a directed graph with a distinguished node, the point (Section 2.2)
Accessible pointed graph (apg): a pointed graph, every node of which is reachable from the point by a chain of directed edges (Section 2.2)
Decoration: the unique assignment (speciﬁed by (2.2)) of sets to the nodes of an apg (2.2)
Picture of a set: the pointed graph in whose decoration, the set corresponds to the point (Section 2.2)
Labeled graph: a graph with an arbitrary assignment of sets (the labels) to the nodes (4.1)
Labeled decoration: a labeling dependent decoration of a graph (speciﬁed by (4.2))
Histogram: replaces a collection by a set as the domain of a set valued function (Def. 4.2)
M-Z equation: speciﬁes the labeled decoration of a graph arising from neural networks (Def. 4.4)
Hebb’s rule: speciﬁes the synaptic weight change in a model neuron (Def. 4.5)
McCulloch–Pitts equation: speciﬁes the binary valued output of a model neuron (Def. 4.6)
Set types
Collection: a set as deﬁned by Cantor
Naïve set: another name for a collection
Set: a primitive construct, the subject of the Z-F axioms
Bona ﬁde set: a set, emphasizing its being speciﬁed as a primitive deﬁned by Z-F
Pure set: a set whose elements are sets, whose elements of elements are sets. . .
Path: a sequence of nodes (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) linked by directed edges
Well-founded picture: a graph whose paths are ﬁnite (in particular, one without loops)
Non-well-founded picture: a graph with an inﬁnite path
8 For convenience, some of the deﬁnitions listed here are abbreviated. In such cases more complete deﬁnitions are found in the text.
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Non-well-founded set: a set whose picture is non-well-founded
Normal set: a set that does not contain itself
Abnormal set: a set that contains itself
Platonic set: a not physical set, a not computable set, a set located in a virtual space
Classes
Class: a collection of sets with a common property
Proper class: a class that is not a set
U : the class or universe of sets
A: the class of abnormal sets
N : the class of normal sets
Fundamental operators
E : elimination
I: identity
B: brace, singleton
R: Russell
T : anti-Russell
D: duality operator
C: a particular consciousness operator
Types of operators
O : a generic operator
K : a generic consciousness operator
KA : a special class of consciousness operators parameterized by a set A
Kdiag : diagonalization of the family of operators KA
Selectors: operators O with the following property: x ⊆ y ⇒ Ox = x∩ O y
